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The Yokohama Declaration of May 2008 recognizes Africa’s potential for 
human development without downplaying the formidable challenges 
the continent faces. In relation to Human Security, the multiple tasks 
ahead pertain to the need for peace, good governance and sustainable 
development, areas requiring the active participation of local communities 
and individuals. The central message of this address is that any programme 
for Human Security partnerships, such as envisaged in the Yokohama 
Declaration, must start from a detailed understanding of the various 
forms of human insecurity that exist at local levels. The analytical need is 
for an ethnographic lens on social and individual vulnerabilities as is here 
demonstrated with reference to war-torn eastern Democratic Republic 
of Congo. In reviewing vulnerabilities in relation to youth (recruitment of 
child soldiers), livelihoods (access to land) and various basic human rights, 
this address argues that an understanding of human insecurities at the 
individual and community level, during and after conflict, requires empirical 
data and detailed attention to pre-conflict conditions.   
1.  HUMAN SECURITY
The Yokohama Declaration of May 2008, the outcome of the Fourth Tokyo 
International Conference on African Development (TICAD IV), aims to work 
‘Towards A Vibrant Africa’, an Africa that builds upon its capabilities and 
partnerships, and ‘asserts ownership’ over its destiny. Progress to date - 
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forms of human insecurity that exist at the level of communities and 
individuals. I shall focus in particular on vulnerabilities relating to gender, 
livelihoods, ethnicity and young people. In addressing specific insecurities, I 
shall invite you also to develop a sense of history, because the legacy of the 
pre-war era – three decades of rule by President Mobutu Sese Seko - is still 
felt throughout the DRC.
The war in eastern DRC is a stubborn war. It goes on and on. A recent 
issue of MSF Dispatches (Spring 2008) recalls that the province of North 
Kivu has seen some of its most intense fighting between August 2007 
and January 2008. Despite a peace agreement signed that January, which 
brought hope, people remain desperate: crops and property are being 
lost; violence, disease and displacement sum up their daily lives. An MSF 
representative said: ‘The long-term impact of violence in Congo is that 
people cannot get access of health care …, they are dying from completely 
preventable problems.’1
 This disturbing insecurity comes five years after the European Union (EU) 
sent emergency troops to Ituri district (see map) to stop the carnage on the 
streets of capital Bunia. What had shocked the EU into action was not only 
the deadly violence, but also the participation of thousands of child soldiers 
who were ‘out of their minds’; children high on drugs, bizarrely dressed, 
and without pity for helpless civilians. 
The objective of the EU intervention – named Operation Artemis – was 
different from that pursued in classic military confrontations, which is to 
attain victory on the battlefield. For Artemis, the goal was ‘not victory but 
[the] cessation of violence, in order to provide space for political solutions’.2 
Being a different kind of intervention, Operation Artemis gave rise to the 
term Human Security. Analyst Mary Kaldor saw in Artemis confirmation 
that the EU (and the world at large) needed to believe in a new strategic 
narrative. But the success of Artemis needs qualifying. While the dual 
perspective of ending violence and creating political space is noble and just, 
we also know that political solutions can mean different things to different 
people. Therefore, even when space for solutions is provided, the range 
of challenges can still be so vast that the Human Security framework for 
     
1 MSF Dispatches, UK Issue No.48, Spring 2008, p.9. 
2 Mary Kaldor (2004), ‘A human security doctrine for Europe, and beyond,’
International Herald Tribune, 30 September 2004. 
in trade, investment and tourism - suggests that sustainable growth can 
be achieved. In turn, sustainable growth should lead to poverty alleviation 
and better ‘quality of life and self-reliance’ (Yokohama Declaration 2008: 
2). Participants at TICAD IV stressed, however, that Africa still faces huge 
challenges. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) will not be attained 
unless something dramatic is done to reverse trends in unemployment and 
poverty; poor agricultural productivity and infrastructure; the low level 
of industrialization; the deadly diseases; inadequate access to education 
and basic health; and, of late, soaring food prices. Against this mixture 
of progress and unresolved challenges, TICAD IV committed itself to 
partnerships in three inter-related priority areas, among them Human 
Security. 
The concept of Human Security demands that partnerships focus 
on peace, good governance and sustainable development. The 
concept ‘underscores freedom from fear and freedom from want … 
[and] emphasizes the protection and empowerment of individuals and 
communities’ (Yokohama Declaration 2008: 4). At the community level, 
on which this keynote address concentrates, the multiple tasks ahead 
have a strong gender dimension. Planning for a better future means 
addressing gender ‘disparity in education, violence against women, and 
insufficient participation of women in all spheres of decision making, 
while taking account of the cultural specificities of different countries’ 
(Yokohama Declaration 2008: 5). The Declaration calls for the recognition 
of women’s roles in peace building and economic productivity, agriculture 
in the first instance. The logical extension of this recognition is that legal 
instruments must be crafted to protect women’s rights and advance their 
empowerment. Responding to ‘cultural specificities’, it needs to be said, 
is no easy matter because culture is never bounded and often contested. 
It is because of the complexities involved in ‘understanding culture’ that a 
regional case study and an ethnographic lens were chosen for this address.  
Before turning to eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), whose 
conflict I shall review from the angle of Human Security, let me state that 
quite a range of issues need to be tackled at the level of communities 
and individuals (see TICAD IV Yokohama Action Plan 2008: 14). My 
key message comes down to this: any programme for Human Security 
intervention needs to start from a detailed understanding of the various 
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‘the concept of human rights continues to grow as a set of principles, social 
movement, and legal framework opposing oppression’ (Messer 1997: 310). 
With this in mind, I believe that the concept of Human Security will also 
mature and spread, and result in more effective and better contextualized 
interventions. That said, I must add the proviso that working at the level of 
‘communities and individuals’ – the level at which TICAD IV is committed 
- is a lot harder than commonly thought. In my experience, there is a long 
way to go before high-level politicians and policy makers will feel confident 
that their thoughts and formulae for a more secure world reflect reliable 
understandings of what happens inside communities. 
2.  WAR IN EASTERN DRC: AN OVERVIEW
In 1996, when its national security was threatened by militarized refugee 
camps in eastern Congo, then called Zaire, the government of Rwanda sent 
in troops to dismantle the camps. Confirmation that Rwanda had invaded 
its ‘big neighbour’ had to wait until July 1997, when President Paul Kagame 
informed The Washington Post that his army had led and fought in what 
until then had been called a purely local rebellion. Commonly referred to as 
the Banyamulenge Tutsi rebellion, this ‘purely local’ uprising had gathered 
momentum and developed into an alliance - the Alliance of Democratic 
Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL), led by Laurent Kabila - 
which ousted Zaire’s dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko. This short episode is 
called Congo’s First War. 
Having toppled Mobutu, president Laurent Kabila then sent his 
Banyamulenge and Rwandan advisers home. None too pleased, these 
‘sacked allies’ retaliated by launching the Second War, which took on full 
international overtones. Besides Rwanda, countries like Uganda, Zimbabwe, 
Angola, Chad and Namibia all entered the battlefield. Starting in August 
1998, the Second War was something of a re-run of the first rebellion, 
at least initially (see Pottier 2002). The explicit motive, once again, was 
Rwanda’s (and Uganda’s) need for regime change in Kinshasa, a change 
that would bring stability and security along shared borders. 
What follows is a skeleton overview of the main rebel groups that 
emerged during the Second War.  
Initially, the rebel movement which started the second war was known 
action may seem like nothing but idealistic, wishful thinking.  
Where do I stand? There are times when the Human Security agenda 
does indeed strike me as a wish-list of noble goals that, even under the 
best of circumstances, will take a lifetime to achieve. This does not make 
me a sceptic, however. My position is that I regard occasions like the 
present symposium as part of a global discourse that needs to be pursued, 
because discussing the concept of Human Security in all its facets will 
make it possible for those directly involved in security to reach common 
understandings and new insights. 
In many ways Human Security is a concept akin to that of Human 
Rights. There are sceptics who still lament that the Universal Declaration of 
1948 was an imposition by the liberal West; there are others, whose side I 
am on, who argue that there is an ongoing, pluralist dialogue about human 
rights, and that the concept has evolved since its launch. More specifically, 
?????????????????????????????????????
62 ???????????????????????????? 63?????????????? ??????????????????????????? ??
2002 was also the year of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, the mass 
consultation which led to the formation of a Transitional Government. 
What happened after the main talks ended, however, would prolong the 
conflict. At the closure of the main talks, in April, Jean-Pierre Bemba had 
emerged as the strong man of the armed opposition; he was named Prime 
Minister designate. The plan was welcomed by the UN Security Council, 
but rejected by Congo’s main rebel group (RCD-Goma), by Congo’s main 
opposition party (UDPS),7 and by Rwanda and the United States of America. 
Under pressure, president Joseph Kabila gave in and announced that the 
political dialogue needed re-opening; he removed Bemba from the position 
of Prime Minister, thus making him one of four vice-presidents. Bemba 
then broke off relations with Kinshasa and resumed his rebel activities.  
Installed in 2004, the Transitional Government brought peace to much 
of the DRC, but not to the east. Rather than peace, Ituri district and the 
two Kivu provinces saw an intensification of conflict. It is useful briefly to 
give some details of the unrest in both Ituri and the Kivus. What I want to 
stress here is the conflict’s global-local dimension, which is typical of all of 
Africa’s so-called New Wars.    
2.1  Ituri district
In highly simplistic terms, the conflict in Ituri pitted ethnic Hema (pastoralists) 
against ethnic Lendu (cultivators); they quarrelled over land.8 The wider 
picture, however, is that the initial squabbles escalated into full civil war 
once neighbour Uganda interfered by sending troops. 
With the Ugandan army supporting prominent Hema in their quest for 
land, the conflict turned catastrophic when UPC leader Lubanga seized 
Bunia in August 2002. Lubanga launched a virulent racist discourse in 
which all non-Hema (mainly ethnic Lendu, Ngiti, Bira and Nande) were 
targeted. Now called non-originaires (non-natives), it was a death sentence 
for many of them. Bunia’s Lendu population fled the town, while tens 
of thousands of displaced rural Hema filed in to occupy abandoned 
      
7 UDPS = Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social. 
8 Not all Hema are pastoralists. Today, the majority of Hema in Djugu Territory are 
subsistence cultivators (Thiry 2004: 111, note 7). For an overview of Ituri’s ethnic 
composition, see Pottier (2006, 2008). 
as the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD). It had ethnic 
Banyamulenge fighters at its core.3 From its inception, however, the 
RCD was rife with internal disagreements; its chair, Professor Wamba dia 
Wamba, who wanted political reform and transparency, found himself 
opposed to the rebellion’s militarists. When, in April 1999, the military 
expressed dissatisfaction with Wamba’s performance, he and his supporters 
(among them Mbusa Nyamwisi, now a minister) broke away and set up the 
RCD-Mouvement de libération (RCD-ML).  
RCD-ML moved north and allied itself with Uganda, which sent military 
aid and troops. This led to a number of shoot-outs with the original RCD, 
now referred to as RCD-Goma.4 Uganda and Rwanda were fighting a war 
between themselves, on Congolese soil. After moving to Bunia, in Ituri 
district, RCD-ML experienced tension between Wamba and Nyamwisi, 
notably about the possible merger with a third rebel movement, called 
the MLC (Mouvement pour la libération du Congo), headed by Jean-Pierre 
Bemba. The MLC had been launched from within Uganda with the backing 
of president Yoweri Museveni. 
Uganda’s support for Wamba evaporated in February 2002, when Jean-
Pierre Bemba arrived in Ituri with instructions from Museveni. Within weeks, 
Bemba removed Wamba dia Wamba and appointed Nyamwisi (ethnic 
Nande) as head of the Ituri administration. Feeling empowered, Nyamwisi 
then turned against his colleague John Tibasima (ethnic Hema), kicked him 
out of the region and took control of RCD-ML, which he renamed RCD-K-
ML.5 These events made Bemba pull out of central Ituri to resume his own 
war against the Kinshasa government. Reacting to Nyamwisi’s betrayal, 
Museveni sent troops and tanks into Bunia, causing Nyamwisi to flee. To 
fill the power vacuum thus created, ethnic Hema launched the Union des 
patriotes congolais (UPC). Ethnic Hema were politically and economically 
dominant in Ituri. Knowing of Uganda’s interest in the region, UPC leader 
Thomas Lubanga quickly secured official Ugandan support.6
      
3 Banyamulenge (literally: people from Mulenge) are the descendants of ethnic Tutsi 
from Rwanda who arrived in Congo over a century ago. 
4 RCD-Goma = Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie – Goma.
5 RCD-K-ML = Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie – Kisangani, mouvement 
de libération.
6 Thomas Lubanga currently stands trial at the International Criminal Court in The 
Hague. 
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The rest of Ituri’s conflict history can be summarized. Arriving in Bunia 
in June 2003, with a Chapter VII mandate, Operation Artemis (the EU rapid 
intervention force) quickly secured most of Bunia, but could not stem the 
violence that now moved to the countryside, where rural Hema became a 
soft target for FNI/FRPI assaults. When Artemis ended and MONUC troops 
were boosted, the UN continued to struggle to make Ituri secure.13 In other 
words, Operation Artemis may have been the first Human Security military 
intervention, but its positive impact was seriously limited and localized (see 
MSF 2003). Among the successes were the stabilization of (half of) Bunia’s 
population and the return of thousands of residents - and Hema IDPs who 
had fled Bunia in May – within roughly one month. What brought them 
back, however, was not so much the relative safety of the town as a sharp 
increase in rural insecurity, which Artemis could not prevent. Artemis also 
made Bunia relatively safe for IDPs, yet, again, it could not change the fact 
that most quarters (quartiers) in this divided town remained under militia 
control at night. More positively, however, Operation Artemis did prepare 
for the deployment of a stronger MONUC force the following September. 
When Ituri’s warring factions declared peace on 14 May 2004 and 
signed the Kinshasa Act of Commitment (Acte d’engagement de Kinshasa), 
the arrangement was a classic example of the ‘international community’ 
rushing in in search of a much needed victory. The Act had no future. 
Warlords had ‘entered the negotiations knowing that if their largely 
unreasonable demands for status, jobs and immunity from prosecution 
were refused, they would continue their activities without fear of sanction’ 
(International Crisis Group 2004: i). Unsurprisingly, fighting in Ituri 
continued until – officially – the middle of 2007.14
Since I may be at risk of offering too much detail, let me now make 
three points regarding the internal dynamics of the Ituri conflict. Firstly, 
ethnic Lendu. During the conflict, Hema formed the UPC militia (Union des Patriotes 
Congolais), led by Thomas Lubanga; Lendu formed the FNI (Front Nationaliste et 
Intégrationiste), led by Floribert Njabu. Irumu’fs Hema, in contrast, are referred to as 
South Hema, its Lendu are commonly known as Lendu-Bindi or Ngiti. Ngiti formed 
the FRPI militia (Force de Résistance Patriotique d’Ituri), while South Hema joined 
the UPC. In membership terms, FNI and FRPI did not distinguish between Lendu and 
Ngiti.
13 GAA (German Agro Action) Situation Report Ituri, 1-16 September 2003. 
14 IRIN, 21 August 2007.  IRIN = Integrated Regional Information Network, UN Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). 
homes. The number of internally displaced people (IDPs) in Bunia grew to 
60,000, predominantly Hema.9 That same month Lubanga’s UPC attacked 
Songolo village, again killing many Lendu/Ngiti civilians. To avenge the 
atrocities, Lendu/Ngiti combatants then carried out their (second) attack on 
Nyankunde, supported by troops led by the ousted Mbusa Nyamwisi. They 
callously massacred 1,200 Hema and Bira.10
But Lubanga, too, would lose Uganda’s support. Following his exclusion 
from the national peace talks, because he was a political newcomer, 
Lubanga signed a collaborative agreement with RCD-Goma, Rwanda’s 
proxy. Angered, Museveni then dropped his support for Lubanga, making 
Chief Kahwa (Banywagi Hema) his new protégé. On paper, Kahwa’s 
military faction became a political party named PUSIC (Parti pour l’unité et 
la sauvegarde de l’intégrité du Congo). Together with other militia groups, 
including the Lendu-dominated FNI (Front nationaliste et intégrationiste), 
chief Kahwa set up FIPI, the Front pour l’intégration et la paix en Ituri. On 6 
March 2003, a combined UPDF-FIPI force ousted Lubanga from Bunia.11
At this point, the ‘international community’ stepped in, but 
miscalculated when the UN Mission in the Congo (MONUC) insisted that 
the Ugandan military depart from Bunia on the date previously agreed. The 
departure was premature. Notwithstanding the excesses of individual UPDF 
commanders, who had been in the district since 1998/9, the Ugandan army 
had provided a modicum of stability, which the UN failed to recognize. The 
consequence of Uganda’s premature pullout was catastrophic. Predictably, 
Lubanga returned; less predictably, he returned with Chief Kahwa in 
support! (It is remarkable how quickly military alliances have been made, 
unmade and sometimes remade in this conflict.) Lubanga and Kahwa took 
on the Lendu (and Ngiti) militias in a violent battle that killed over 400 
civilians. The battle also caused the displacement, often a second fleeing, 
of most town dwellers. Bunia was cut in half: FNI/FRPI troops controlled its 
southern half, UPC/PUSIC the north.12
     
9 Amnesty International Open Letter to the UN Security Council, 17 October 2002. 
10 Human Rights Watch 2003: 30. 
11 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Monitoring de la 
Situation en Est RDC: au 09 mars 2003. 
12 Ituri has five administrative territories, two of which feature here: Djugu and Irumu. 
 Djugu is associated with ethnic Hema, a.k.a. Gegere Hema or North Hema, and with 
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six months, leader Lubanga sent gold to Rwanda in exchange for weapons. 
But gold is just one example of a natural resource whose extraction 
needs regulating. Coltan, diamonds and timber (amongst others) have to 
be added. Coltan, a rare ore, has been particularly instrumental in fanning 
the flames of conflict (see UN Security Council 2002). The bottom line is 
that we cannot discuss human (in)security in eastern DRC without also 
discussing the conflict’s strong international dimension. 
2.2  The Kivus 
The conflict scene in the Kivus has its own characteristics, but shares 
common elements with Ituri. The chief similarity is that politico-military 
elites have sought ‘to consolidate their power base and reward their 
supporters by extending control over land’; land wrenched from established 
communities (Vlassenroot 2008: 197). The region of Masisi (North Kivu) 
offers a prime example. After RCD-Goma gained control of the region, 
Banyarwanda Tutsi leaders used their influence within the rebel movement 
and local administration to strip ‘autochthonous customary chiefs of control 
over land. Local administrators and customary chiefs who did not support 
TDP [Tout pour la paix et le développement, an NGO facilitating the return 
of Banyarwanda refugees who had fled to Rwanda], were systematically 
replaced’ (Vlassenroot 2008: 205). The Banyarwanda Tutsi elite thus took 
substantial tracts of land away from autochthonous groups (e.g. Hunde), 
turning them into zones extra-coutumières, i.e. spaces outside the control 
of customary chiefs. 
The displacement of entire village populations during the war has also 
been documented by Hélène Morvan (2005), who researched the Mayi-
Mayi movement in South Kivu. Here, too, the quest for land acquired 
ethnic overtones. In Shabunda territory, for example, where Mayi-Mayi 
leader Padiri had his headquarters, ‘autochthonous’ Rega accused Padiri 
of having brought with him a good number of Tembo supporters, who 
then robbed local Rega of their land. Although Padiri claimed he was 
‘above tribalism,’ Rega chiefs countered that his Tembo followers ‘are 
foreign to the region, they have come to take our riches and trade them 
with their [ethnic] brothers. Today they are strong, we have surrendered, 
but one day we will ask that our sons take up arms and chase them away’ 
as already seen, the Ituri conflict began with a land dispute in which 
Lendu agriculturalists clashed with Hema landowners who had purchased 
ancestral Lendu land on which to graze their livestock. The Hema farmers 
claimed they had purchased the land legally, i.e. in the spirit of the General 
Property Law of 1973, and they had the documents to prove it. This was 
unacceptable to the Lendu farmers who now faced instant eviction (which 
was not according to the law). For Lendu, the purchases smacked of 
blatant collusion between wealthy Hema livestock keepers and influential 
Hema officials in town. Facing immediate expulsion, because Hema hired 
Ugandan soldiers to speed up the evictions, the Lendu agriculturalists 
resorted to violence, which, in the absence of an authority structure for 
arbitration, spiralled out of control. 
Secondly, at various times during the conflict, Hema as well as Lendu/
Ngiti militias called for the wholesale expulsion of the ethnic other. In 
January 2001, Lendu chiefs in Djugu Territory demanded that Hema from 
Blukwa (historically the heartland of Gegere Hema) vacate their land, 
because these Hema were now just ‘visitors who are living here in these 
hills’.15 Likewise, in 2004 the Hema-dominated UPC called for the forced 
migration of Lendu out of Djugu (Pottier 2008). Under these conditions 
of threatened wholesale expulsion, the return of IDPs becomes a tough 
challenge. The main threat of ethnic cleansing, however, came in 2005 
when an FNI militia (loyal to Peter Karim) destroyed some seventy Hema 
villages. This gave rise to a serious humanitarian crisis (details further down). 
Thirdly, military conquest, with its focus on land, is driven also by the 
international hunger for precious minerals. Ituri’s high-quality gold, for 
example, has attracted warlords and transnational mining corporations 
alike. I note the active presence in Mongbwalu of AngloGold Ashanti 
(part of Anglo-American) and the Swiss gold-refining company Metalor 
Technologies. AngloGold Ashanti developed links with the Lendu-
dominated FNI (Human Rights Watch 2005b). Along with other natural 
resources, Mongbwalu’s gold found its way to Uganda, from where it 
reached global markets. Other warlords too have coveted Ituri’s gold, killing 
civilians and torturing artisanal miners who failed to pay their taxes. When 
the UPC gained control of Mongbwalu in September 2002, a site it held for 
     
15 IRIN report on Ituri, 25 January 2001.
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3.  HUMAN INSECURITIES DURING WAR TIME: livelihood 
and food insecurity, physical violence, vulnerable youth
I shall now look at basic human insecurities from a local perspective, which 
means focusing on ‘individuals and communities’ (Yokohama 2008: 4). 
In presenting these insecurities, starting with livelihood deprivation, I will 
also present insights from academic research. The wider context here is 
that people in eastern DRC have been displaced on a massive scale, often 
permanently. To put a percentage to it, a recent survey of 600 villages 
across eastern DRC has found that 61 percent of households had been 
displaced at least once between 1996 and 2007 (DRC TUUNGANE 2008). 
The main reason for this massive displacement, I reiterate, is that politico-
military elites use land to reward allies and backers, and followers, while 
they also use land to exploit minerals and sustain the war. 
3.1  Livelihood insecurity: loss of land, cattle and food markets
During the war, with rebels and local militias expropriating land by force, 
the Kivus saw land under cultivation fall by almost 30 percent. In addition, 
there was reduced access to markets, now too dangerous to be held, 
and a parallel collapse of the region’s already dismal road infrastructure. 
Cattle theft too was excessive: surveys conducted in North Kivu show a 
50 percent drop between 1996 and 2004 (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 
2008: 160). These thefts made farmers shift from raising cattle to raising 
small livestock.
In Ituri as well, besides the theft of land, the war resulted in widespread 
cattle rustling. In October 2002, the UN Panel of Experts exposed how 
armed Hema, supported by Ugandan UPDF troops, forcefully took cattle 
from Lendu villagers for the benefit of commercially oriented elite Hema. 
The FAO representative in Bunia reported how the UPDF offered protection 
‘against attacks that they themselves ha[d] orchestrated, in exchange for 
regular payment in animals’ (UN Security Council 2002: paragraph 117).
Let me now make a first key point.  In terms of the post-conflict 
recovery of livelihood assets, it is land that needs looking at most urgently. 
And land must be understood in a historical context. The challenge of post-
conflict recovery includes addressing pre-conflict conditions. What is that 
(quoted in Morvan 2005: 63). (In other parts of South Kivu, it was ‘surtout 
les Rwandais’, Rwandan military units, who controlled mining sites after 
removing villagers.) Regarding the position of displaced Rega, however, it 
was doubtful whether their young men had much of an appetite for taking 
up arms. As Morvan learned in relation to villages abandoned in 1999 
and 2000, youths from there had moved away to more peaceful ‘zones 
rich in minerals’ (e.g. quarries near Shabunda and Walikale), where they 
appeared little inclined to contemplate returning home (2005: 63-64).  This 
information introduces an important insight: the old and the young may 
have different views on what constitutes ‘home’ or their ‘heritage’, which 
cautions against treating ‘culture’ as being bounded and fixed. 
Again, the conflict’s international dimension must be recognized. In 
some areas, villagers were forced off their lands because of contracts 
awarded to international companies. Thus in North Kivu, in late September 
2001, Rwandan soldiers forcefully moved the inhabitants of several villages 
after RCD-Goma had awarded exclusive logging rights to a Kenya-based 
timber company. The contract specified that no cultivation must take place 
on the site, which effectively deprived the villagers of their main source of 
subsistence (Amnesty International 2003: 28).
The fighting in Kivu has also been marked by the terror activities of 
the renegade Laurent Nkunda. In 2004, Bukavu (South Kivu) witnessed a 
mutiny of ‘Banyamulenge’ forces enlisted in the newly integrated national 
army (the FARDC). Following intense combat, the pro-Rwanda dissidents 
then spread their operations to North Kivu, where the Nkunda caused 
terror and massive displacements.16 Despite the peace agreement of 
January 2008, Nkunda remained at large, recruiting and training fighters.17
     
16 Clashes between the Congolese army and Nkunda’s troops earlier this year, near 
Rutshuru, caused 40,000 people to flee.
17 IRIN, 6 August 2008. After Nkunda's troops terrorized the population in the second 
 half of 2008, Nkunda was ‘neutralized’ through a military plan that involved 
Rwanda. On 5 January 2009, Bosco Ntaganda, his military chief of staff, declared he 
had taken control of Nkunda's CNDP troops.
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on their side, since commercial ranching was boosted by internationally 
funded herd health projects (Schoepf and Schoepf 1990: 94; Fairhead 
1992: 25). 
Within this climate of international assistance and state-centred 
patronage, customary chiefs and other officials began to excel in the design 
of expropriation strategies. One such strategy was the use of trumped-up 
charges. 
For example, each man in the village must carry receipts for tax 
payments and proof that he has voted, as well as a Carte pour Citoyens. 
Receipts, however, often cost more than the amount received, and 
identity cards are kept unavailable by the local authorities. (Fairhead 
1992: 22)
Other strategies included the falsification of land registration documents 
(1992: 26).    
The knock-on effect was rampant livelihood insecurity for the rural 
masses, and a concomitant need for protection. If they were not expelled 
at the point of expropriation, villagers found themselves increasingly 
‘squatting’ on land their families had cultivated for generations. They were 
allowed to squat, but only if they paid ‘rent’ – read: protection money - 
to customary chiefs, and sometimes churches. Paying rent usually meant 
providing a man-day of (unpaid) corvée labour per week (Fairhead 1992: 
29). In other words, control over land became a lever to gain control over 
labour (Schoepf and Schoepf 1987: 22-26), and ultimately, as became clear 
in the 1990s, a lever to control the minds of impoverished people. In sum, 
we must understand that – well before the First War began - traditional 
chiefs and the military worked hand-in-glove to create poverty and make 
people dependent on them. 
In the 1990s, land became even scarcer, while the concept of 
protection was widened to include political allegiance to new landowners. 
This situation took a turn for the worse when, under pressure from the 
international community, Mobutu launched his democratization process 
in the early 1990s. From then on, struggles over land became ethnic 
struggles, resulting in inter-ethnic clashes and displacements because of 
ethnicity. Loyalty in return for ‘squatting’ rights now meant supporting the 
context? The General Property Law of 1973, already mentioned, decreed 
that all land – including land managed under customary tenure – had 
become state property. The upshot was that local/customary chiefs could 
now expropriate ancestral land previously held in perpetuity, and sell it for 
private gain. The 1973 legislation affected rural populations in two ways: 
firstly, secure occupation/residence no longer existed; secondly, customary 
leaders lost interest in ensuring the rights of their people, they now invested 
in networks of state patronage. The patrimonial system president Mobutu 
had set in motion meant that high-level political loyalty was increasingly 
rewarded with titles to swathes of land suited for commercial exploitation. 
The scale of the expropriations (known as ‘spoliation’) is well 
documented for the Kivus, where entire communities came to be 
dispossessed (‘despoiled’) to make way for plantations and cattle ranches. 
The work of anthropologists Brooke and Claude Schoepf (1987, 1990) 
offers a window on the scale of spoliation: 
Between 1979 and 1983 more than one thousand new land title 
petitions were filed at the title registry office for North Kivu. Big 
businessmen, multinational firms, government officials and chiefs have 
been involved. Repression, including arbitrary arrests, extortion and 
crop destruction have been employed against peasants who refused to 
abandon homes and fields. Many have been forced off the land; others 
now work in exchange for squatter rights. (Schoepf and Schoepf 1990: 
93; emphasis added)18
The importance of this finding is twofold: one, forced expropriations 
(resulting in displacement) hurt people well before the recent wars began; 
two, international interest was also part of the problem. Fertile Masisi (North 
Kivu) is a case in point. Before 1996, one-third of the arable space publicly 
available was already controlled by landowners involved in ‘commercial 
ranching and plantations of coffee, tea or pyrethrum’ (Vlassenroot 2008: 
201). These nouveaux riches, moreover, had the international community 
     
18 Schoepf and Schoepf comment that the land policy is officially dressed up as 
a ‘national integration’ strategy, i.e. the policy ensures that all citizens now can have 
equal access to land throughout the national territory (Schoepf and Schoepf 1990: 
93). 
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3.2  Bodily and sexual violence
Besides opportunistic land grabbing, extortions and the collapse of 
infrastructure, the war resulted also in gruesome human rights violations, 
often of a sexual nature, ‘unspeakable’ mutilations, and alleged acts of 
cannibalism. Allegations of cannibalism have been rife in Ituri and other 
parts of eastern DRC, but they are sometimes fabricated and used for 
political ends, i.e. to discredit opponents (see Pottier 2007). On the other 
hand, mutilated bodies or body parts have regularly been displayed in 
public, in order to intimidate and terrorize. 
Crucially, from a Human Security perspective, it must be recognized 
that the human rights situation did not improve when the Transitional 
Government took office in 2004. On the contrary, the widespread rape 
of women and children continued to increase.19 By 2005, the appalling 
situation made the UN declare that Congo was now ‘the biggest, most 
neglected humanitarian emergency in the world today’, and that ‘sexual 
abuse … had probably become worse there than anywhere else in the 
world’.20 For that same year, Human Rights Watch (2005a) asserted that 
tens of thousands of women and girls had suffered crimes of sexual 
violence by armed forces; all forces being equally guilty.21 Sexual violence 
was still a systematic weapon 
to terrorize communities into accepting their control or to punish 
them for real or supposed aid to opposing forces. 
… In many cases, combatants abducted women and girls and took 
them to their bases in the forest where they forced them to provide 
sexual services and domestic labor, sometimes for periods of more 
than a year. (Human Rights Watch 2002: 1)
Academic research on sexual violence in wartime confirms that ‘the 
body’ is used as a carrier for violent messages that terrify communities 
     
19 IRIN, 8 March 2004. 
20 Daily Observer (Liberia), 17 March 2005. Statement by the UN Under-Secretary 
General for Humanitarian Affairs. 
21 See Year Reports by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices by the US State Department. 
patron’s political vision and discourse – and discourses radicalized once 
Mobutu began to ‘democratize’ his political system. At this point, some 
aspirant politicians in eastern DRC launched into discourses of ethnic hatred 
– and sometimes used the promise of land – to rally their followers around 
them. The stark reality was that the young thugs who swore allegiance to 
powerful, emerging elites (read: potential warlords) often did so because 
they were too marginalized, too insecure, not to do so. 
To conclude, what matters today is that the violence and livelihood 
insecurity seen in eastern DRC during conflict are, in actual fact, extreme 
forms of a well-known structural violence which has its roots in so-called 
peace time. (Rural people, I should add, now rely on agriculture for their 
livelihood, as opportunities for lucrative migrant work have dried long ago. 
New mining opportunities for some young men may be the exception, but 
these, even if lucrative, rarely benefit the families back home.)  
But the war did not just result in widespread displacement and 
heightened land insecurity, and hence in sharply reduced levels of food 
production and consumption. The war also resulted in the total disruption 
of the inter-zonal food flows that had been so crucial for achieving basic 
food security in pre-war days (Pottier and Fairhead 1991).  It may seem 
‘obvious’ that the infrastructure for local food markets collapses when war 
prevents people from growing crops and visiting markets. After all, food 
markets are a well-known target during conflict. What made the crisis in 
eastern DRC all the more acute, however, was that the war disrupted not 
only the infrastructure for markets that moved food between ecological 
zones, but it also crippled Kivu’s capacity for exporting beans to Kinshasa 
and other major towns. Before the war, ‘Kinshasa’s main provider of beans, 
maize and meat were the Kivus, ... after the war it was cheaper to import 
agricultural products from Zambia, Tanzania, South Africa and other 
countries’ (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2008: 161). While this observation 
must not detract from the difficulties small-scale producers had when 
‘playing the market’ before the war (Pottier and Fairhead 1991), the shift 
has undeniably undermined the ability of households throughout eastern 
DRC to make money and stay food secure.  
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The social position of the child in eastern DRC was most forcefully 
expressed in 2003, when warlord Thomas Lubanga (UPC) decreed
that each family in the area under [the] control [of UPC] must contribute 
to the war effort by providing a cow, money or a child for the UPC’s 
rebel militia.22
At the time, UNICEF protection officers firmly believed that ‘families 
and communities [sent] the children’ not just to the UCP, whose fighting 
force reportedly was 50 percent children, but also to other militias.23 
Humanitarian workers sometimes linked this parental or community 
consent to the area’s trenchant poverty. The SCF Programme Director for 
the DRC, for example, commented that ‘where abject poverty is the norm 
many children and their parents find it difficult to see alternatives’.24 While 
there is much of value in this perspective (see the section on DDR, below), 
we should also be aware that children in Africa are socialized into active, 
responsible members of society (Toren 1996). Children may want to join 
the militias without being coerced. This does not mean, however, that they 
cease to be victims; they are still victims of circumstance. 
But children can also be disowned by families and communities. In 
Kinshasa, for example, thousands of rejected children live on the streets, 
where they move ‘between the worlds of the visible and the invisible, life 
and death, daily reality and its nocturnal double’ (De Boeck 2004: 156). 
Accused of witchcraft, these children move in and out of what is known 
as the ‘pandemonium world’ or ‘second world,’ a world deemed capable 
of overwhelming the ‘first world’ of everyday reality. Kinshasa’s revivalist 
Christian churches have spawned frenzied discourses about witchcraft 
in children, and regularly ‘accommodate’ children who confess to having 
experienced the ‘pandemonium world’ which they visit as nocturnal 
cannibal witches. 
In the war, militias too were spurred on by extreme religious 
imaginations, as seen in the ranks of the ferocious Effacez troops under 
     
22 IRIN, 7 February 2003; reported by Radio Okapi, MONUC’s own radio. 
23 http://groups.yahoo.com/group/osint/message/32605. Accessed 15 June 2003. 
24 Save The Children Fund (SCF) circular posted on ReliefWeb, 16 June 2003.
and individuals (Broch-Due 2004: 24). Such a perspective makes us see 
violence as embedded in existing cultures and cosmologies, rather than in 
a universal ‘culture of war’ (2004: 16). These cultures and cosmologies may 
explain why sexual crimes are not publicly condemned, and why they are 
instead ‘surrounded by a protective wall of silence’, as Sharon Hutchinson 
learned during her research among Nuer in South Sudan (Hutchinson 2004: 
135). Nuer girls who had been raped would attempt to hide the fact from 
their mothers. Alcinda Honwana (2006) makes a similar point regarding 
demobilized girl soldiers in Mozambique. They too struggled with taboos 
associated with rape and sexual abuse: ‘Feelings of shame and guilt and 
the fear of stigma prevented many young women from telling their stories’ 
(Honwana 2006: 21). 
Research also suggests that silence and stigmatization become more 
pronounced when communities fear extinction. In the face of collective 
despair, discourses of morality amplify the symbols of normality and self-
control, and advocate zero-tolerance towards social deviance. As Scheper-
Hughes and Bourgois (2004) remind us, in the wake of a political violence 
comes a symbolic violence that may turn victims into ‘living-dead people, 
refusing to speak of the unspeakable; [they] are often shunned or outcast 
by kin and community, and even by comrades and lovers’ (Scheper-Hughes 
and Bourgois, 2004: 1).  
Violence against civilians, women in particular, also has an 
underreported seasonal/agricultural dimension. As I learned from Ituri 
refugees in Uganda, at the beginning of each agricultural season displaced 
women experienced pressure to return home and tend to gardens. But 
women who attempted to return home had no guarantee that militias 
would let them do so without ‘punishment’. 
3.3  Vulnerable youth: the plight of child soldiers
To understand the life-world of child soldiers two perspectives are helpful. 
Firstly, children in sub-Saharan Africa are not treated as individuals, they 
rather belong to larger social structures. Secondly, over the past decade, as 
a result of the spread of a revivalist Christian fundamentalism, children ‘in 
trouble’ increasingly see themselves as living in a ‘pandemonium world’ cut 
off from the everyday reality they once knew. 
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Covering the war in Liberia, Stephen Ellis (1999) has made similar 
reference to seemingly carnivalesque behaviour: young men posing for 
photographs in the midst of ‘incomprehensible slaughter’, or wearing 
women’s wigs and adorning themselves with human bones and other 
grotesque decorations (Ellis 1999: 17). Child soldiers carrying both AK-47s 
and teddy bears have also been a common sight. 
4.??INTERVENTIONS IN THE NAME OF HUMAN SECURITY
Having discussed key human insecurities, let me now turn to  humanitarian 
interventions. I will select for comment a small number of interventions, 
or intervention phases, to reveal the magnitude of the Human Security 
challenge. As stated at the beginning of this address, the concern is to 
keep a ‘community and individual’ focus. I shall concentrate on aspects 
of Human Security where humanitarians may face particularly difficult 
conceptual problems and dilemmas. In addition, I shall comment on the 
programme for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), 
which is at the core of the Human Security programme in eastern Congo. 
Since I began with livelihood insecurity, let me now also say something 
about food aid and livelihood support. 
4.1  Food aid and livelihood support 
Food aid failing to reach the needy is a common problem in war, just 
as it is in times of famine (Pottier 1999). In eastern Congo, combatants 
have at times gone to extremes to deny food aid. Referring to the theft 
of 100 tonnes of WFP food aid by RCD-Goma soldiers in 2001, Amnesty 
International wrote: 
The theft was carried out like a military operation… . Staff of the UN 
World Food programme (WFP) had encouraged the local population 
to return to their homes, after extended displacement in more 
inaccessible areas, to obtain humanitarian aid and resume cultivating 
their fields. Promises of security and permission to distribute the aid 
had been obtained from RCD-Goma authorities, traditional chiefs 
and commanders of armed groups operating in the area. However, 
MLC control. They fought in Ituri in 2002-3 seeking inspiration in the Bible, 
and were subsequently accused of cannibalizing Mbuti pygmies (Pottier 
2007). There were many disaffected youth among the Effacez; some had 
joined out of anger because they could no longer go to school, while 
others had looked upon the military as a substitute for family. 
Likewise, in the Kivus and in Katanga, Mayi-Mayi fighters have stood 
accused of cannibalism. But whether they practised it, and what kind of 
cannibalism it was, remains unclear. After spending five months researching 
in Bunyakiri, a region then under Mayi-Mayi control, French anthropologist 
Hélène Morvan preferred to keep an open mind. If cannibalism was 
practised, she wrote, it happened in a ritual context (Morvan 2005: 78). 
Some Mayi-Mayi child soldiers (kadogo) whom Morvan interviewed did 
indeed speak of rituals in which bone ash of slain Rwandans had been 
used. 
What applies to Kinshasa’s disowned children (shege) also applies 
to child soldiers. Many are believed to be cannibal witches for whom 
reintegration into society is a near impossible, dangerous undertaking. 
This is particularly the case for girl soldiers who have lived as bush wives to 
militiamen, and who may have both given life (birth) and taken it through 
killings. What cannot be denied, however, is that ‘Pandemonium’ children 
who entered the war often turned out to be without mercy. They terrorized 
people not just through the weapons they fired, but also through their 
dress and demeanour, especially when wielding both Kalashnikovs and 
symbols of childhood. Young boys often appeared on the scene in girls’ 
dresses. A media report on child soldiers serving in the FRPI militia had this 
to say: 
the boys have taken to dressing up. One wears a red straw hat of the 
style favoured by the late Princess Diana. Another, not to be outdone, 
has made a headdress out of a baseball cap and a blue nylon tablecloth 
wrapped around it. Yet others, a little older and fully aware of the fear 
they already inspire thanks to their weapons, have accentuated the 
effect by wearing wigs that give them dreadlocks flowing to the waist 
or a white papier-mâché mask with dehumanising effect.25
     
25 http://groups.yahoo.com/group/osint/message/32605. Accessed 15 June 2003. 
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delays once a conflict ends. When I joined an AAA reconnaissance party on 
the Katoto-Blukwa road (a no-go area for the UN and other NGOs), there 
was ample evidence that crops – maize and beans - were being cultivated. 
It was a good sign, even though it was quite likely that the rebel faction in 
control, UPC-Lubanga, would claim its share of the harvest.  
Working with ‘all parties’ during conflict is both laudable and 
hazardous. The AAA reconnaissance party I travelled with was intercepted 
by UPC-Lubanga and forced to return to Katoto at gun point. Some months 
later, another AAA party was also taken hostage and humiliated, with one 
AAA worker being shot and MONUC needing to come to the rescue.26 
Coming at a time of heightened insecurity, the incident resulted in AAA 
delaying and changing plans, and caused problems with donor ECHO, who 
seemed inflexible about project completion dates.27
But agricultural needs were high. For example, by 2005, Ituri district 
struggled to find the right planting materials, even for cassava. With the 
conflict now in its sixth year, the FAO in Bunia had started to import cassava 
cuttings from Kisangani. Access to maize seed, too, was problematic; most 
farmers were planting fourth and fifth generation hybrid seed that was 
practically sterile.28
While I regard agricultural recovery to be a programme that cannot wait 
until a conflict ends, it is entirely normal that intervening agencies focus 
first and foremost on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). 
What is the experience with DDR in eastern Congo?  
4.2  Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)
 
DDR began in 2004 with international funds, including from Japan, 
being channelled through the UNDP.29 Initially, MONUC shared many 
responsibilities with Congo’s newly integrated army (the FARDC); 
responsibilities included attacking militias that refused to disarm, but 
MONUC gradually passed all responsibilities on to the national army. 
     
26 IRIN, 25 February 2005. 
27 IRIN, 4 April 2005. 
28 IRIN, 4 April 2005. 
29 IRIN, 3 November 2003. Japan contributed US 3.7 million (408 million yen) towards 
DDR.  
immediately after distribution of the food in several villages, RCD-Goma 
combatants visited and threatened each household, forcing people to 
give up the food. Many people fled the area again after the incident. 
An observer told Amnesty International: “… [soldiers] also took 
the villagers’ clothing and any livestock, and even cut down the crop 
of banana trees. Cultivated ground was trampled over. Everything was 
taken away in a convoy of trucks.” (Amnesty International 2003: 10)
In DR Congo, food theft by ‘the authorities’ is common also in peace 
time. Under Mobutu, food theft by those in power happened on market 
days, for example, although theft generally took the form of money 
extortions. The extortion principle – popularly known as Article 15, 
Débrouillez-vous - still lies at the heart of the Congolese socio-political 
fabric; it remains the chief reason for livelihood and food insecurity. The 
scene Amnesty described reminds us that many ‘chiefs’ continue to side 
with other powerful actors, not with their own people. (There is a lesson 
here for policy makers and practitioners concerned with governance.)
There may be little humanitarians can do to prevent looting by 
heavily armed militias, but there is a challenge they need to respond to. 
The challenge is that food aid in wartime must be part of a package 
for agricultural recovery (commonly known as ‘seeds and tools’) which 
should get under way during the conflict itself. For this to happen, and the 
challenge is huge, humanitarian organizations need to work with ‘all sides’ 
in the conflict, which is hard to achieve and equally hard to justify since 
working-with-militias is frowned upon in many international circles, not 
least within the United Nations.
Let me give an example. In Ituri, in 2004, the German NGO Action 
Agricole Allemande (AAA), or German Agro Action (GAA), rehabilitated 
roads in areas where the conflict was ongoing. AAA also worked as the 
implementing agency for the World Food Programme (WFP). Its approach 
was to work with all parties in the conflict, and be transparent about 
it (Pottier 2006). The AAA work ethic had its critics – who argued that 
working with warring parties meant helping warlords – but the approach 
also drew admiration, mostly in private comment. A positive byproduct of 
this bold approach was that seeds-and-tools reached needy populations 
during the war itself, thus avoiding the all too familiar problem of excessive 
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expectations ran high and promises were made, but projects remained 
few. Throughout eastern DRC, disappointed ex-fighters complained that 
they disarmed without any prospect of reintegration. A former Mayi-Mayi 
fighter in Katanga said: ‘We are forced to live under miserable conditions 
with other displaced people as we await a solution. We are suffering.’33 
Disarmed and disappointed, many returned to violent ways.34 In September 
2006, a FARDC commander called the process ‘a pretence’.35
A further problem slowing down DDR was that certain militia leaders 
did not want fighters to disarm. The problem came to the fore in Ituri after 
government soldiers (FARDC) started to disarm militiamen by force. In the 
wake of the first attack – against the UPC at Solenyama – UPC ‘General’ 
Bosco Ntaganda and ‘Colonel’ Linganga reportedly executed militiamen 
who favoured disarmament. They also appear to have killed already 
demobilized fighters.36 For his part, Peter Karim (FNI) kept combatants on 
the ground despite his acceptance to serve in the FARDC.37 His troops still 
collected taxes some eight months after he had agreed to lay down arms. 
While progress has been made in terms of disarmament,38 the 
challenge of DDR continues and further conflict is expected. In Ituri, the 
most active militia is the FRPI, which, along with some other groups, 
blames government for prolonging the crisis. The militias that remain 
are demanding ‘the immediate release of FRPI, FNI and UPC soldiers … 
arrested in the towns of Bunia, Kisangani and Kinshasa’.39
Many former child soldiers, girls especially, also face severe difficulty 
when attempting to reintegrate as they are often rejected by their families 
and communities. According to humanitarian sources, girls mostly ended 
     
33 IRIN, 18 September 2006.
34 IRIN, 8 April 2005, cites the case of ex-FRPI fighters who disarmed at Aveba, and 
of whom only 65 out of 248 found temporary employment in ComRec-financed 
road and health centre rehabilitation projects. Many then left for Bunia, where 
unemployment was high and opportunities for re-entering militias existed.
35 IRIN, 17 September 2006. See also IRIN, 8 April 2005, 29 June 2006, 5 June 2007. 
36 IRIN, 18 April 2005; also Monitoring de la Situation Humanitaire en RDC, 4-10 June 
2005.
37 Monitoring de la Situation Humanitaire en RDC, 4-6 June 2007.  
38 Situation humanitaire, District d’Ituri, 4-10 June 2007.    
39 IRIN, 22 August 2008. FRPI troops have allegedly set up camp near the Ruwenzori 
Mountains, where they are in close contact with (and being armed through) 
Ugandan dissident fighters belonging to NALU (National Army for the Liberation of 
Uganda) and the ADF (Allied Democratic Forces).
While pockets of resistance continue in some regions, it is clear that DDR is 
coming to an end – at least as far as disarmament (the first D) is concerned. 
In June 2007, Mbusa Nyamwisi, now the internal affairs minister, said that 
thousands of combatants still awaited demobilization and reintegration, 
despite the fact that 130,000 had already disarmed. The latter included 
2,610 women and 30,200 children. For Ituri, the latest figures spoke of ‘at 
least 25,000 ex-combatants [having] disarmed, with more than 10,000 
children being demobilized’.30
In Ituri, CONADER, the National Commission for Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reinsertion, started confidently by setting up a transit 
centre near Aru. The centre could process one hundred fighters a day. 
A consultant explained: ‘They stay for four days, during which they are 
oriented about their options to either enter civilian life or be integrated into 
the new Congolese Armed Forces. Most important is that they can make 
a free decision … . We keep them in groups of 25 and constantly monitor 
them, so that no one can exert pressure on them regarding their decision.’ 
A UNDP officer added: ‘The ex-militias also get their eyes scanned so that 
they cannot go through the process twice and benefit several times of the 
support packages handed to them. We give them an entry kit …, US $50 
for the trip home and food rations for one month for a family of five’.31 
Everything seemed under control.
However, it soon emerged that reintegration into society was far 
from straightforward. Leaving aside that certain communities might not 
want their demobilized combatants back, the reconstruction projects 
designed to reintegrate them were mostly either not functioning well or 
unsustainable. There were also delays with implementing these projects. 
As a result, disarmed militiamen were hanging around towns harassing 
people for food and money; they discouraged others from disarming. In 
Kasenyi, for example, the committee in charge of community projects for 
demobilized soldiers received ‘business plans’ from disarmed militias keen 
to work in reconstruction, but the application procedure was complex and 
cumbersome, and success not guaranteed.32
Given the emphasis on local ownership (always a slippery term), 
      
30 IRIN, 22 August 2008. 
31 IRIN, 22 March 2005. 
32 IRIN, 8 April 2005, has details. 
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registered children lost the support of their hosts.43
Humanitarians were also concerned about the low number of 
demobilized girls who sought help. A Congolese humanitarian worker told 
me: 
While many girls in need of protection seek help, there are few former 
child soldiers among them. Demobilized girls seem destined for lifelong 
displacement and destitution. They are really beyond the pale, and 
often stigmatized as witches. Even the ones who do come for help to 
our centre tend not to stay very long. We feed them for two months, 
they put on weight, then disappear and may lose the weight they had 
gained. Some are re-recruited into the militias.44
The issue of demobilized girls not seeking humanitarian help raises some 
important questions, the most basic one being: is it stigma that keeps 
demobilized girls away from help by humanitarians or do they prefer to 
use (are they told to use) local strategies for reintegration? The question 
of whether local strategies exist invites other questions too. For example, 
what should agencies do when it turns out that families condoned the 
recruitment of child soldiers? And what should they do if/when it transpires 
that communities had no choice when told to send children to such or 
such a militia? My personal view is that the no-choice scenario may well 
apply in eastern DRC because of the region’s long history of land insecurity 
whereby the rural poor are ‘tied’ to landlords (reviewed above). The 
concern I present can be stated in the form of two simple questions that, I 
believe, are insufficiently asked and answered. Are there local-level, cultural 
mechanisms that facilitate the reintegration of child soldiers? And if so, 
how do these mechanisms work, and how efficient are they? The dilemma 
for Human Security workers is that they often work in what is for them 
uncharted territory, and need to ask challenging questions about their own 
preconceptions. 
I can do little more here than highlight the lack of information on 
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2004.
44 Bunia interview, 25 April 2004. 
up as prostitutes, while boys, older ones especially, are known to have 
rejoined militias or turned to banditry. One demobilized child was quoted 
as saying ‘What will I do without my family? The army is my family’.40
4.3  Reintegration of child soldiers
As with agricultural recovery, the reintegration of former child soldiers calls 
for action well before conflict ends. But where does one begin? Regarding 
the conflict in Ituri, which drew in a high number of child soldiers, it seems 
that the British NGO Save The Children (SCF) initially took the lead, asking 
that child soldiers be treated as victims of war. SCF’s initial response, 
as the war was ongoing, was to run awareness campaigns for military 
commanders aiming to obtain ‘the release of children and preventing new 
recruitment’. SCF trained rebel commanders on child protection issues, 
including the UN Convention on the Rights of Children. SCF also told 
warlords that ‘they may have to answer tomorrow for crimes committed 
today’.41
Sensibly, SCF knew that a concerted effort was needed. In Ituri, it called 
for the active  participation of the Ituri Pacification Commission and also 
of Operation Artemis. The latter  needed ‘to have the resolve and support 
to disarm the military groups, enhance the protection of children and their 
families wherever they are and to bring to justice those who are using child 
soldiers to perpetrate this conflict’.42
The call to protect not just the child soldiers but also their families 
reveals how delicate and complex (tricky) the matter was, especially 
at the community level. As with disarmed adults, reintegration was 
not straightforward. A glimpse of just how complex and sensitive the 
challenge was could be seen in 2004, when various local and international 
organizations (e.g. Bureau Diocésain de Caritas Développement, PAV, 
Caritas, IRC, SCF-UK, COOPI) reported that host families – with whom they 
had placed children to prepare them for reunion with their own families – 
were struggling to the point of despair. In Mahagi town, for example, 43 
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41 Save The Children Fund (SCF) circular posted on ReliefWeb, 16 June 2003. 
42 Save The Children Fund (SCF) circular posted on ReliefWeb, 16 June 2003. Emphasis 
added. 
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4.4  Psycho-social responses to sexual violence
Throughout the DRC, the need to respond to crimes of sexual violence 
stands high on the humanitarian agenda. In early April 2004, for example, 
the Italian NGO COOPI worked with rape victims in Nyankunde (Ituri), 
running short awareness-raising campaigns46 and encouraging victims to 
come forward. On this occasion, eleven women publicly denounced their 
military aggressors.47 The information COOPI released at the time suggested 
that victims increasingly step forward to testify to their ordeals and seek 
professional humanitarian help.48 As part of its Nyankunde programme, 
COOPI offered ‘health and psychological care and … elementary education 
with the possibility of professional training and courses in health care and 
sanitation’ (COOPI Annual Report 2004).  In some parts of Ituri, COOPI’s 
support programme included the distribution of agricultural inputs, such as 
hoes, seeds, and spraying equipment. 
While I cannot comment on the quality of the services that COOPI and 
other organizations run for victims of sexual violence (e.g. the IRC, Medair, 
Caritas), the issue of public testimony in the case of sexually abused women 
and girls is culturally sensitive. Victims do not usually come forward ‘until 
the consequences of the rape become visible’ in pregnancy.49 The moral 
issue then, for humanitarians, is whether or not to challenge the ‘wall of 
silence’ that ‘culture’ seems to build. 
Commenting on this dilemma is outside the scope of my address, 
but I am aware that away from the DRC, in South Africa for example, 
public testimony on sexual violence has come in for criticism. In South 
Africa, public testimonies before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC) have been researched and judged as doing more harm than good. 
For example, Fiona Ross highlights how women’s testimonies of sexual 
violence have tended to be ‘constructed, drawn from [the testifier] through 
persistent questions and repetitions’ (Ross 2004: 225). Testimonies have 
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47 OCHA (2004) Humanitarian Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Monthly 
Updates, April – December 2004.
48 See OCHA’s bi-weekly Monitoring de la Situation updates. 
49 OCHA, Monitoring de la Situation en Est RDC: du 16 au 22 Octobre 2004.
‘local’ strategies for the treatment of demobilized child soldiers. Treatment, 
however, may be available – e.g., through revivalist churches – and trying 
to understand these (culturally appropriate?) approaches to ‘social healing’ 
should be a matter of ethics, part of the job description, for humanitarians 
in charge of demobilization. But humanitarian ‘professionals’ may not 
want to know about local practices. This is an argument Filip De Boeck 
has made with regard to child-witches in Kinshasa. De Boeck argues that 
humanitarian organizations working in Kinshasa at the end of the 1990s 
did not value the fact that revivalist churches took child-witches into their 
care. This non-valuing was to a large extent caused by ignorance, i.e. 
agencies not understanding that church discourses and practices (such as 
witch-naming sessions) included known-and-trusted  ‘traditional divinatory 
models’ (De Boeck 2004: 162).  
What De Boeck writes about Kinshasa is applicable to the reintegration 
of child soldiers. The question begs: Do Christian fundamentalist churches 
in eastern DRC deal with the reintegration needs of former child soldiers? 
And if so, what are their practices? To put it ethnographically, ‘local 
services’ need to be understood before they are ignored or condemned 
by international NGOs and UN officers in charge of child protection, 
or positively appreciated. It is a Human Security challenge that requires 
urgent attention. The UN Mission in Congo (MONUC) has alerted us to 
the fact that the ‘work’ (exorcism sessions) of these churches must not be 
rejected without a serious attempt at understanding practices. Churches 
may need guidance, as MONUC puts it, but they do/can/should play a role 
in the reintegration of child soldiers.45 (What I do not know as yet is how 
much progress has been made in terms of UN/NGO/independent research 
on revivalist practices in eastern DRC. I believe this remains a seriously 
underresearched field.) 
The difficult issue of what is ‘culturally appropriate’ (see Yokohama 
Declaration above) applies also to interventions that aim to alleviate war-
induced trauma. Here too, questions about authority and expertise need to 
be asked. 
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local and international, decided to close down the camp and send the IDPs 
home. Atlas Logistique, which ran the camp, justified the decision saying 
that the camp now 
offer[ed] living facilities (running water, electricity, free parcels...) that 
have reached a better level than those of the population living in [Bunia] 
city. This fact is contrary to  “Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement” 
elaborated by OCHA.51
The head of Atlas Logistique told reporters: ‘We think that for the moment 
there has been considerable progress in efforts to restore the socio-
economic and security situation in Bunia and in the rest of Ituri District.’52 
Indeed, some IDPs had been going home. But the 7,000 still at Aéro said 
they would not go home as they had no homes to go to. Those who 
originated from Djugu territory considered the area still too insecure to 
contemplate a return. But the authorities stood firm.53
How safe was Djugu at that precise time? The assertion that Djugu 
was safe came as a surprise when one considered the wider picture. Firstly, 
between December 2004 and March 2005, there had been a resurgence 
of the ‘ethnic cleansing’ Djugu had seen at the beginning of the conflict. 
FNI militias destroyed some 70 Hema villages and hamlets, causing the 
displacement of around 100,000 people, or roughly the territory’s entire 
Hema population. IDP camps sprung up in four locations.54 The resumption 
of ‘pure ethnic’ fighting by the FNI, which spread to Irumu in 2006, may 
not have been as murderous as in 1999-2001, but it did result in ‘selected 
killing, rape, total destruction of entire villages and kidnapping for sexual 
slavery’ (statement by MONUC’s coordinator for human rights in Ituri).55
Secondly, just days before Atlas Logistique decided to close Aéro camp, 
it was reported that Ituri’s largest militias – FRPI, FNI and UPC-Lubanga - had 
been active in the territories of Djugu and Mahagi.56 The situation in Djugu 
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53 IRIN, 8 July 2005. 
54 IRIN, 8 March 2005. 
55 IRIN, 23 March 2005.
56 Monitoring de la Situation Humanitaire en RDC, 25 June – 1 July 2005.
often been written up in a suggestive manner which presents ‘the event 
of sexual molestation [as something the women] had intended to speak 
of … all along and had done so without prompting’ (2004: 225). In sharp 
contrast to official claims, the women Ross interviewed spoke about 
their testimonies in terms of a second violation. They stressed how the 
Commission’s Report had stripped away important issues besides the rape 
or torture, especially ‘other violations’ and the complexities of returning to 
their communities. 
4.5  Security for IDPs and former IDPs 
Several times already I have referred to the problem of massive population 
displacement. As we have seen, for a good part of the conflict years, 
ensuring the safety of IDPs has been beyond the capacity of the 
humanitarian agencies. I attribute this neither to a lack of personnel nor 
to a lack of resources or commitment, but first and foremost to the fact 
that populations have been moving constantly. This was certainly a feature 
of Ituri’s emergency in 2003, when military alliances were made, unmade 
and remade with bewildering speed. Significantly, the headache has yet to 
go away. In June 2007, following renewed attacks on civilians, UNHCR’s 
assistant high commissioner for operations, Judy Cheng-Hopkins, referred 
to the DRC as being in ‘a state of permanent displacement’.50 Each time 
a group of civilians returns home, she said, another group is displaced by 
new fighting elsewhere. The large number of displaced, still estimated at 1.2 
million (OCHA/DRC 2008), is a worrying feature.
A related challenge is that when aid agencies scale down operations 
they need to be confident that it is safe for IDPs (or refugees) to return 
home. And here organizations may experience that adhering to the 
humanitarian principles results in other concerns being overlooked. Again, 
as with the forced withdrawal of the Ugandan troops (UPDF) from Bunia in 
2003, one must ask whether the ‘humanitarian community’ has the means 
to access, digest and act upon accurate intelligence. 
The example of Bunia’s Aéro camp for IDPs, near the airport, is a case 
in point. Two years after it had been set up in May 2003, the authorities, 
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88 ???????????????????????????? 89?????????????? ??????????????????????????? ??
for the debate on governance. In this final section, I briefly review how 
the International Rescue Committee (IRC) conceptualizes the question 
of governance at the grassroots level. The IRC runs a programme for 
community-derived reconstruction in eastern DRC, called TUUNGANE, 
which is ‘designed to support economic recovery, foster social cohesion, 
and improve the quality of governance’ (DRC Tuungane 2008: 2). In line 
with the Human Security framework, community-driven reconstruction 
(CDR) is a strategy increasingly used in post-conflict settings worldwide 
(2008: 7). 
My intention is not to discuss the programme itself, but to draw 
attention to what a recent baseline report on TUUNGANE had to say 
about the ‘political attitudes of communities’ (2008: 2). After revealing 
that ‘61 percent of household members in the sample were reported as 
having been displaced at least once at some point from 1996 to 2007,’ the 
baseline report stated that the majority of respondents had ‘no problems in 
terms of being refused access to basic economic and social activities’ (2008: 
2). However, ‘some 10 percent report[ed] that new arrivals in villages make 
conditions harder and many report[ed] a resistance to welcoming new 
arrivals of particular sorts – notable ex-combatants and foreigners’ (2008: 
2). Resistance to newcomers may have been indicative of the fact that 
for these communities-in-flux accessing land remains a concern (as seen 
above).   
Of equal interest, with respect to governance the Baseline Report 
mentions some 
surprising results. … Our respondents saw decision making power in 
their communities as being clearly vested in the hands of the village 
chiefs, and to a lesser extent in the hands of elders. Traditional chiefs 
from beyond the village are also influential. Community members 
and women and youth groups in particular play a marginal role in the 
eyes of our respondents. This suggests in some way a lack of a norm 
of public participation in decision making. Strikingly too, when asked 
who should play the biggest roles, the answers are similar: there is no 
evidence of a demand here for more participatory decision making. (DRC 
Tuungane 2008: 3; emphasis added)
caused so much concern that ECHO (the EU sponsor) reminded  donors 
that Djugu territory was ‘where the Ituri conflict began; [it] remains the one 
Territory … still devoid of any administrative or law enforcing agents’.57 (The 
local administration had fled to Bunia after Djugu town was ransacked in 
December 2004.)  ECHO’s message implied that understanding insecurity 
was a central task for anyone authorized to make decisions about the 
return of displaced people. Clearly, those who decided to close Aéro had 
followed one humanitarian principle, but without close scrutiny of the 
security concerns that prevailed. The security situation in Djugu did not 
ease until the second half of 2006, when the displaced started to go home 
in larger numbers.58
As a final thought on the violence of 2005-6, let me caution against 
overly homogenous portrayals of community. While MONUC was emphatic 
that the violence was ‘definitely not genocide,’ it did not play down the 
atrocities nor indeed the complicity of Lendu civilians. As eyewitnesses 
revealed, the raids on Hema villages had followed a pattern: militias 
attacked with guns and machetes, and were followed by women, children 
and even elderly people who looted and carried away anything of value. 
They then burnt homes to the ground.59 The conclusion I draw from this is 
that local people may be tired of violence, as humanitarians like to say, but 
they are not all passive bystanders. They may condone violence, or they 
may want to stop it. Regarding the latter, some Lendu villagers are known 
to have become intolerant toward ‘their own’ FNI combatants (see Pottier 
2008). The implication for understanding the local scene is straightforward: 
when it comes to assessing ‘local attitudes’ towards peace and peaceful 
relations with the ethnic other, analysts must refrain from treating civilians 
as a single, homogenous entity. Civilians are likely to hold more than one 
view on what kind of conflict resolution they want to see. 
4.6  Democratic Governance 
My calling for a nuanced understanding of ‘community’ has implications 
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as possibly a case of working against the cultural grain, in that openness 
about sexual violations is mostly frowned upon in local settings. However, 
young women in Nyankunde today may well want to distance themselves 
from such conventions, regarding them as outmoded and unhelpful. 
They may argue that the time has come for the taboo to be lifted (as I 
sometimes experienced in Rwanda immediately after the genocide, when 
‘hiding things’ seemed absurd). These are delicate negotiations that outside 
‘professionals’ may or may not be adequately prepared for. I gave the 
example of Nyankunde not to critique the intervention by COOPI, but to 
highlight that taking ‘culturally appropriate’ action may mean confronting 
controversy at the community level.   
Humanitarians working with child soldiers may also need to go against 
the grain, but in this case the task in hand must start with scrutinizing 
in-house policy and practice. Agency workers do not routinely look for 
value in so-called ‘traditional’ ways. Rather they tend to impose their own 
understandings, methods and ethics with little or no regard for local-
level practices. In the first instance, agency workers need to familiarize 
themselves with the fine detail of local practices for social reintegration, 
and bring valuable elements into their own (external) programmes for 
protection. 
Paying attention to local context also requires that humanitarian 
agencies have access to timely, accurate information on security, and that 
they make a commitment to digest that information and act upon it. A 
blind commitment to principles is not appropriate. The UN insistence in 
2003 that the Ugandan troops pull out of Ituri by a deadline that should 
have been reconsidered, turned into disaster and gave the war a new 
impetus. Likewise, the decision to close the Aéro camp for IDPs came at a 
time when human insecurity was going up rather than down.   
Finally, I have argued that addressing Human Security in post-conflict 
settings requires attention to pre-conflict concerns. This is extremely 
pertinent in a situation like that of eastern DRC, where rural poverty is 
endemic because of the institutionalized manner through which land has 
been systematically taken away from local communities. To achieve lasting 
Human Security in a post-conflict Congo, partnerships will need to be set 
up to assess and rectify the 35 years of officially sanctioned land abuse 
that have made the past decade of conflict and war possible. Tackling 
Some respondents, however, did ask for more transparency when chiefs 
make decisions, even to the point of proposing that they should serve 
fixed-term periods in office.  
Let me make just one comment on this finding. In view of the land 
situation outlined earlier on, the ‘surprising results’ with respect to 
governance should not surprise us at all. Chiefs control land in collusion 
with the police, the army, administrators and other politicians; and, through 
land, they control people’s loyalty and political orientation. The plight of 
the unfree, already visible by the 1980s, has become even more entrenched 
over the past decade. With people being ‘tied’ to the local authorities, 
chiefs in particular, there is no real surprise in the statement by survey 
respondents that power is still vested in the hands of the village chief (and 
other chiefs beyond the immediate locality). I make this point to highlight 
how formidable a challenge ‘achieving governance’ becomes when it is 
understood in a historically informed, local context.    
5.  CONCLUSION: HUMAN SECURITY IN LOCAL CONTEXTS 
While the international community is increasingly capable of brokering 
peace agreements and stabilizing post-conflict economies - points 
acknowledged in the Yokohama Declaration (2008) - it is still struggling 
to ensure the security of individuals and communities, as the case of 
eastern DR Congo demonstrates. While peace deals may hold, ending 
crime, unemployment and human rights abuses are a much taller order. 
By focusing on humanitarian challenges at the ‘community and individual’ 
level, I have offered some explanation as to why the Human Security 
challenges remain so formidable even when peace generally seems on the 
cards. 
Working at the ‘individual and community level’ is difficult business. 
Moving away from the complex details this address has presented, it is 
clear that ‘community’ is a slippery concept that cannot be taken to mean 
homogeneity above all else. We have to unpack and problematize the 
concept of community.  Similarly, the idea of ‘culturally appropriate’ action 
requires close scrutiny. If communities are heterogeneous, as they invariably 
are, then it follows that cultural appropriateness will also be open to local 
scrutiny and debate. I presented the COOPI intervention in Nyankunde 
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the culture of rewarding political loyalty with land concessions (a practice 
not to be confused with privatization) remains the biggest obstacle to 
achieving Human Security in eastern DRC. An overhaul of the land law of 
1973 should include giving consideration to gender equity in the way land 
is legally accessed. (The recent Rwandan legislation which aims to ease the 
plight of genocide widows might be a useful point of departure.) And of 
course, an inappropriate national land policy cannot be rectified without 
considering how global economic markets benefit from the continuation of 
(so-called) local conflicts.
